The Visegrad Group and the EU agenda on migration: A

coalition of the unwilling? by Stepper, Péter
P. STEPPER  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
62 
 
The Visegrad Group and the EU agenda on migration: A 
coalition of the unwilling? 
Peter Stepper1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
More than a million refugees applied for asylum in member states of the European Union 
in the course of 2015. Along with the challenges of the central Mediterranean migration 
route, new hotspots of migratory movements emerged, such as Hungary. The EU is faced 
as a result with a number of challenges connected to its asylum policy, mostly because its 
system was not designed with the prospects of a persistent mass influx of refugees in 
mind. Although the recast process of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
established the possibility of financial compensation, supportive measures and early-
warning mechanisms, no common system for a more equal distribution of refugees was 
accepted. Initiatives aiming to establish resettlement and relocation mechanisms based on 
distribution keys were not supported unanimously. Among the prominent persistent 
objectors to such plans are the Visegrad Four (V4) countries who express a strong interest 
in securitising irregular migration. This article aims to explain V4 countries’ reactions, 
and examines whether a fundamental reassessment of the CEAS is really needed or 
possible in the near future. 
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Introduction 
More than a million refugees applied for asylum in member-states of the European Union 
until 22 December 2015. Along with the challenges of the central Mediterranean 
migration route, which represents the greatest challenge in the field of border 
management and asylum policy since 2012, new hotspots appeared on the map after 2014. 
                                                          
1 Peter Stepper is a PhD candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest, and lecturer at Eötvos Loránd 
University and at the Budapest Metropolitan University of Applied Sciences. He is Editor-in-Chief of the 
Hungarian security policy quarterly called BiztpolAffairs and a proof-reader of the journal Nemzet és 
Biztonság issued by the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest. 
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Hungary registered a total of 199,165 asylum applications up to the end of October 
in the course of 2015 (Nagy, 2015: 1). This is the second largest number after Germany, 
the main destination country for refugees. The Common European Asylum System 
(hereinafter: CEAS) was thus challenged, because the system was not designed to 
smoothly manage the persistent mass influx of people. In fact, the original idea behind 
the CEAS, as it exists since 1999, was mostly not burden-sharing, or the equal distribution 
of refugees across Europe but to prevent secondary migration, to provide adequate 
reception conditions, and to create minimum standards for the asylum procedure. The 
recasting of the CEAS, completed last year, established  financial  compensation 
mechanisms  through  the  European  Fund  for  Refugees  and  the  new  Asylum,  
Migration  and  Integration  Fund  (AMIF). It also called for supportive  measures  for  
weaker  member  states  through  the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and 
early-warning mechanisms in case a Member State  does  not  meet  its  asylum  
obligations.  However, no common system for a less disproportionate distribution of 
refugees was accepted (Bendel, 2015:2). Therefore this article will focus on European 
asylum policy reform and the pros and cons of whether a fundamental re-assessment of 
the CEAS is necessary. It also provides an overview of how the member states reacted to 
the recent asylum relocation plans of the EU Commission.  
After the arrival of Kosovar applicants in 2014 and the mass influx of Syrian, 
Afghan and Eritrean nationals in 2015, the overburdened asylum system of Hungary 
almost collapsed. The Hungarian decision to temporarily suspend the application of the 
Dublin Regulation triggered a meaningful discourse on the issue – even as this decision 
was reversed a few days later.2 Hungary rejected becoming a new refugee hotspot of the 
EU but asked for assistance from member states because of the high number of 
applications at its southern border. Furthermore, Hungary urged the enhancement of 
surveillance in the field of border control, and supported the idea of extraterritorial 
defense to be established in cooperation with a zone of “safe third countries” in the 
Western Balkans. Based on this argument, refugees should not be resettled or relocated 
across the European Union, but simply kept outside the EU’s territory. Hungary bears the 
                                                          
2 A government spokesman announced the suspension of the Regulation. The latter establishes that the 
country where an asylum-seeker first sets foot in the EU must process his/her claim. The government’s 
stated reason for the suspension was that it was “overburdened.” A day later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
said in a statement that it was not suspending any EU regulations, and that it had merely requested a grace 
period to deal with asylum seekers who were arriving at the time (ECRE, 2015). 
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support of the Visegrad Group in this issue and the V4’s regional cooperation could have 
major signficance in influencing future EU legislation in this field. 
The role of the V4 group is noteworthy as these countries implemented the CEAS 
from the very beginning of their EU accession talks. Yet for long they were largely 
unaffected by refugee flows and migratory movements. At the same time, they adopted 
the main security concerns of Western European strategic thinking3 such as terrorism, 
organised crime and irregular migration – key aspects of European security policy 
documents (Schwell, 2015: 4).  
 
The securitization of migration 
According to Schwell, understanding irregular migration as a security risk may have 
begun with the Europeanization of CEE countries and their adoption of the European 
security agenda. This took a dynamic turn in recent years. Securitizing “speech acts” 
(political rhetoric, legislative acts, etc.) appeared in every single country of the V4 
concerning irregular migration, suggesting that transboundary migratory movements 
derive from economic disparities and that “economic migrants” who are crossing the 
border illegally should be sent back. 
The other influential argument behind securitisation is that migrants are presented 
as endangering these countries’ cultural and religious values. This line of argumentation 
rests on ignorance of the numerous reasons why a person might need to leave his/her 
home country (such as coerced displacement, or displacement due to a natural disaster). 
It frames the recent crisis as a new “period of popular migration” (népvándorlás in 
Hungarian; Völkerwanderung in German). 
That understanding may have its own relevance from a historical or a sociological 
point of view, but it does not address the problems related to the current European asylum 
legislation. Almost 900,000 of a total of one-million irregular migrants applied for asylum 
in the EU in 2015, and thus the current situation shall rather be termed a “refugee crisis” 
even as asylum policy issues were not on the top of the policy agenda in V4 countries at 
all (only a few experts raised their voice and urged the improvement of standards 
concerning asylum facilities, detention centers and asylum procedure as a whole). Instead, 
                                                          
3 The European Security Strategy of 2003 is a comprehensive document which analyses and defines the 
EU’s security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for 
the EU. It singled out five key threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organised crime.  
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decision-makers focused on the enhancement of border protection, and quicker and more 
effective border procedures in order to return the “economic migrants” to their country of 
origin or a “safe third country.” 
The fear from a “mass influx” may be rational if one looks at the number of 
arrivals in 2015. For Visegrad countries both the scale and the implications of the 
phenomenon may be unprecedented although it must be noted that these countries were 
not entirely evenly exposed to the migratory movements themselves. 
 
Slovakia 
As Table 1.1 shows, Slovakia did not grant refugee status to more than 80 persons in any 
year in 1993-2004. Although they received more than 10,000 applications in 2003 and 
2004, most of the refugee status determination procedures were halted given that the 
applicants left the territory of the country (presumably towards Western Europe). The 
high number of discontinued procedures shows that the secondary movement of asylum-
seekers was the core problem of asylum policy already before Slovakia’s EU accession. 
 
Year Asylum 
Applications 
Positive 
decisions 
Rejections Discontinuation 
1993 96 41 20 25 
1994 140 58 32 65 
1995 359 80 57 190 
1996 415 72 62 193 
1997 645 69 84 539 
1998 506 53 36 224 
1999 1320 26 176 1034 
2000 1556 11 123 1366 
2001 8151 18 130 6154 
2002 9743 20 309 8053 
2003 10358 11 531 10656 
2004 11395 15 1592 11782  
Table 1.1: Asylum applications in Slovakia 1993-2004 (Hurná, 2012: 1400). 
 
P. STEPPER  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
66 
 
According to Table 1.2, the peak year upon EU accession was 2005, with 3,549 requests. 
Authorities had to deal with approximately 3,000 applications per year in the first years 
post-accession. This amount started to decrease after 2008, and the result was an average 
level of ca. 700 applications annually. Meanwhile Slovakia granted asylum to less than 
one-hundred persons in the whole of the period concerned. 
 We may therefore conclude that Slovakia had virtually no experience with any 
mass influx of asylum-seekers. This may go a long way in explaining the country’s 
relative passivity on CEAS issues before 2014. 
 
Year Asylum 
Applications 
Asylum 
granted 
Rejected Granted / 
Not granted 
subsidiary 
protection 
Discontinued 
2005 3549 25 827 n/a 2930 
2006 2849 8 861 n/a 194 
2007 2642 14 1177 82/646 1693 
2008 909 22 416 66/273 457 
2009 822 14 330 98/165 460 
2010 541 15 180 57/104 361 
2011 491 12 186 91/48 270 
Table 1.2: Asylum applications in Slovakia 2005-2011 (Hurná, 2012: 1401). 
 
However, this posture has changed since 2015. In Pavelková’s words: 
“When […] in October [2015], a group of Syrians temporarily relocated to 
Gabčíkovo municipality objected to the conditions of the housing facilities they were 
placed in, the Minister of the Interior Robert Kaliňák dismissed their critique, 
reminding them that they were not in the hotel Sheraton Arabella” (Pavelková, 
2016:1). 
While the Slovak standards of reception conditions are far below the average in the EU, 
this statement may show that the minister objected to the high costs of improving asylum 
infrastructure. 
 Meanwhile, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico claimed that ninety-five percent 
of those arriving in Slovakia were economic migrants and not refugees, suggesting that 
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their return would be the best solution because they constitute a threat to the welfare of 
the population of Slovakia and the economy itself. Later, he went on to suggest that 
Slovakia should eventually build “barriers to navigate” refugees alongside its borders 
(Pavelková, 2016: 2). Viewing economic migrants as “parasites” is not the only frame of 
understanding pertaining to Slovak government policy and societal discourse. The image 
of the Islamic terrorist hiding in refugee camps also influences the public debate and the 
audience in general. Arguments in connection with religious differences also frequently 
recur in Slovakia. According to Ivan Netik (the spokesperson for the Slovak Ministry of 
Interior) “Slovakia will only accept Christian arrivals […] and he warned […] that 
Muslims should not move to Slovakia because they will not easily integrate with the 
country’s majority Christian population” (quoted in O’Grady, 2015).  
Following the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, PM Fico announced that 
Slovakia will impose tighter security measures in detention and asylum facilities and 
immediately deport every migrant who enters the country illegally. He also suggested that 
Slovak authorities are already monitoring all Muslims in their territory, since “Slovak 
citizens and their security is of a higher priority than the rights of migrants” (Pavelková, 
2016: 7). 
 
Poland 
The first unexpected influx of asylum-seekers in the history of modern Poland was after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (800 applicants), responding to which the country 
established the post of Plenipotentiary for Refugees and an Office for Refugees within 
the Ministry of Interior, on 27 September 1991 (Chlebny - Trojan, 2010: 213). Similarly 
to Slovakia and other countries, Poland is mostly a transit country. Large numbers of 
people (around 100,000) travelled through its territory already in the 1990s, even as 
asylum applications remained below a few hundred in the first half of the decade. 
 
Year Asylum 
Applications 
Positive decisions 
and subsidiary 
protection granted 
Rejections and 
discontinuation of 
procedure 
1992 590 75 58 
1993 819 61 135+235 
1994 598 391 188+362 
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1995 843 105 193+394 
1996 3211 120 375+1454 
1997 3533 139 597+3161 
1998 3373 51 1387+175 
1999 2864 45 2404+762 
2000 4589 52 4537 
2001 4529 296 4233 
2002 5170 279 4891 
2003 6909 245 + 315 6349 
Table 1.3: Asylum applications in Poland 1992-2003 (UNHCR, 2005). 
 
The data from before the EU accession shows a similar pattern to the other countries in 
the region. Asylum application numbers were double that of Slovakia’s in the 1990s but 
the population of Poland is ca. 40 million inhabitants. 
Poland began accepting applications from 1992, after the accession to the Geneva 
Convention. A total of 2067 applicants received asylum since then. The instrument of 
“tolerated stay” was introduced into Polish law in 2004. This status was subsequently 
granted to 7578 people (Lodzinski, 2009: 82).  
Although these data may suggest that refugees should not be the most important 
concern of Polish politics, quite the same trend of securitization started in 2015 that is 
observable elsewhere across the V4 group. Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Poland’s largest 
opposition Law and Justice Party at the time, warned that refugees from the Middle East 
could bring dangerous disease and parasites to Poland. “There are symptoms of the 
emergence of diseases that are highly dangerous and have not been seen in Europe for a 
long time: cholera on the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna… There are various types 
of parasites and protozoa that … are not dangerous in the bodies of these people, [but] 
could be dangerous here,” said Kaczyński (quoted in Ojewska, 2015:2). Speaking at a 
rally during the first week of October, Jarosław Kaczyński, also raised concern that 
Poland could be forced to resettle more than 100,000 Muslims, to which PM Ewa Kopacz, 
leader of the then-ruling Civic Platform party, quickly responded that there was no secret 
plan to accept 100,000 refugees (Cienski, 2015b: 1). Since then, the Law and Justice Party 
has won the elections and Beata Szydło is Prime Minister, while Kaczyński still 
influences politics from the background. 
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Another important aspect of government rhetoric was the need to differentiate 
between “genuine refugees” and “economic migrants” and the proposition of the creation 
of an “extraterritorial defense zone” (a belt of safe third countries) guaranteed by bilateral 
return agreements. Related to this, Polish MEP from the European People’s Party Rafał 
Trzaskowski mentioned the [positive] example of Spain, which saw a steep fall in the 
number of people arriving in the Canary Islands after a deal with African countries that 
allowed Spain to deport economic migrants within eight hours of their arrival. “We have 
to make a list of safe countries to which people are going to be sent back, and then we 
can focus on refugees. I think that would lessen the pressure on our borders,” he said 
(Cienski, 2015a: 1). 
 
Czech Republic 
As part of the political transition following 1989, it was necessary introduce new asylum 
legislation in the Czech Republic. During the 1990s, all the countries of the Visegrad 
region ratified the Geneva Convention, including the Czech Republic. Starting in 1995, 
the country also began to harmonise its legislation, including asylum law, with the EU 
acquis and their first Asylum Act (the Czech Asylum Act, 325/1999 Coll.) was issued in 
1999 (Kopecká, 2015: 47). 
 
Year New Asylum 
applications 
Positive decisions Rejections and 
discontinuation 
of procedure 
1996 2211 162 2049 
1997 2109 96 2013 
1998 4085 78 4007 
1999 7220 80 7140 
2000 8788 133 8655 
2001 18094 83 18011 
2002 8484 103 8381 
2003 11396 208 11188 
2004 5459 142 5317 
Table 1.4: Asylum applications in the Czech Republic 1996-2004 (UNHCR, 2005). 
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According to Table 1.4, the Czech Republic had less than 1,000 positive decisions on 
asylum requests in the ten years after the separation of Czechoslovakia. The peak year 
was 2001 with 18,094 new applications, but the high number of discontinued procedures 
brought similar results as in the case of Slovakia and Poland. In the official statistics of 
the Czech Ministry of Interior, in the course of 1998 Afghan nationals applied for 
international protection in the highest numbers. In the second place, there were nationals 
from the former Yugoslavia, followed by nationals from Sri Lanka and Iraq (Kopecká, 
2015: 47). The period between the years 2000 to 2005 might be considered as the period 
of Europeanization, from which point the harmonization with the EU rules and the 
acceptance of the Dublin II Regulation (Regulation of EU 2003/343/ES) significantly 
influenced asylum trends in the Czech Republic. 
The asylum situation changed significantly in the year 2004 (Kopecká, 2015: 48). 
As Table 1.4 shows, asylum applications decreased to below half the level of the previous 
year. Positive decisions on refugee status have never been above 200 persons per year. 
Czech decision-makers appear intent on keeping these numbers low in the future as well. 
While PM Bohuslav Sobotka is a moderate politician on asylum issues, he still strongly 
rejects any kind of mandatory quota system in the EU. “The Czech Republic is sticking 
to its position of rejecting any mandatory quota system for redistributing asylum-seekers 
among European Union member states”, argued Sobotka ahead of the 22 September 2015 
EU meetings on the migration crisis. “We will strictly reject any attempt to introduce 
some permanent mechanism of redistributing refugees”, Sobotka said, adding that “we as 
well reject using a quota system in any temporary mechanism” (Reuters, 2015: 2). 
The president of the Czech Republic takes an even stronger position in terms of 
migration and refugee issues. President Miloš Zeman warned against welcoming asylum 
seekers and described what he calls a European culture of hospitality as naïve. “I am 
profoundly convinced that we are facing an organised invasion and not a spontaneous 
movement of refugees,” he said in a speech broadcast on 26 December 2015. He also 
drew contrast between Czech nationals who left their country during the Nazi occupation 
on the one hand and contemporary refugees on the other, saying that Czechs intended to 
“fight to liberate the country and not to receive social benefits in Great Britain” (DW, 
2015: 1). Thus the discourse about “economic migrants” appears in the Czech Republic, 
too. Zeman also called for stronger border protection measures. In his view, “rather than 
letting them in, consistent protection of our border by combined patrols of the military 
and police along with the use of the system of active reserves is much better” (Prague 
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Monitor, 2016: 2). Zeman also responded to critics of his stance saying that “Some of 
them have accused me of spreading hatred, fear and panic. These politicians remind me 
of the bathing Czech tourists on the Thai beaches at the time when a small wave appeared 
on the horizon. In fact, it is called a tsunami” (PragueMonitor, 2016: 2). 
 
Hungary 
Hungary has had a refugee population of ca. 6,000 to 9,000 people in its territory with a 
total number of 10 million inhabitants before its accession to the EU (UNHCR, 2005). 
Table 1.5 shows that the average number of new applications was about 5000 people per 
year, The year 1999 saw this peak with 11,499 applications.  The 
rejection/discontinuation rate is comparatively high, but it is still lower than in the other 
three countries which implies that Hungary has not always been merely a transit country 
but also a destination for asylum-seekers. 
 
Year New asylum 
applications 
Positive decisions  
and subsidiary 
protection granted 
Rejections and 
discontinuation of 
procedure 
1996 n/a 172 n/a 
1997 209 159 50 
1998 7097 438 6659 
1999 11499 313 11186 
2000 7801 197+680 6924 
2001 9554 174+290 9090 
2002 6412 104+1304 5004 
2003 2401 176+772 1453 
2004 1600 156+177 1267 
Table 1.5: Asylum applications in Hungary 1996-2004 (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 
2005) 
 
As a direct neighbour of Yugoslavia (and later on Serbia), a significant number of 
refugees fled to Budapest during and in the wake of the 1992 and 1999 wars. The 
increasing applications of Afghan and Iraqi nationals also influenced the general trends 
in Hungarian asylum policy, but did not cause significant growth of the refugee 
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population in the country. This changed significantly after the arrival of ten thousand 
Kosovar citizens in 2014-2015 and with the general refugee crisis of 2015. Since the 
beginning of the latter period mostly Syrian and Afghan nationals tried to access EU 
territory, approaching Hungary via the Western Balkans migration route. 
At the same time as the number of irregular border-crossers reached 2000 per day 
along the southern borders of Hungary, by the first week of September 2015, a 175-km-
long barbed-wire fence was completed on 15 September to keep them out. The second 
amendment of the Act on Asylum designated this a “temporary border closure,” and 
illegal crossing was made a criminal act by introducing Articles 352 A, B, and C into the 
Criminal Code (Nagy, 2015:3). A maximum three-year imprisonment for crossing the 
fence illegally and five years of imprisonment for damaging the fence are applicable in 
the case of perpetrators. 
This goes against Article 31 of the Geneva Convention whereby it is accepted that 
“the Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of [refugees’] illegal entry 
or presence.” Even if the persons of concern are found not have a well-founded fear from 
persecution, and are thus not recognised as refugees, or if the level of general harm in 
their country of origin is not high enough for them to be the beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection (and they thus remain irregular migrants who crossed the border illegally), the 
primary political goal should thus be to return them to their country of origin as soon as 
possible. Regardless of the existing legal imperatives of refugee protection, imprisonment 
for illegal border crossing in Hungary is not a practical idea, given that the prison system 
has its own serious problems, even without thousands of newly criminalised irregular 
migrants. 
Alongside the criminalization of illegal border crossing, a governmental decree 
(269/2015 (IX. 15.) Korm.rend.) introduced the new notion of “crisis situation caused by 
mass migration.” Transit zones were established and new border procedures were 
adopted, applicable only in these zones (Nagy, 2015:4). The result of the establishment 
of transit zones and related border procedures was a significant growth in the number of 
returnees sent back to Serbia which is a “safe third country” according to Hungary’s 
position. 
Requirements regarding this are outlined in Article 39 (1) of the EU Asylum 
Procedure Directive which states that: 
“Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the application for 
international protection and of the safety of the applicant in his or her particular 
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circumstances as described in Chapter II shall take place in cases where a competent 
authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant is seeking to 
enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a safe third country.” 
According to Article 39 (2) a safe third country is a member of the Geneva Convention, 
a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and has an appropriate asylum 
procedure prescribed by its law. Although Belgrade fulfils these criteria, some recent 
reports claim that it could be a wrong presumption to think of Serbia as a safe third 
country (see: Bakonyi et al., 2011). 
 
The Visegrad Group: A coalition of the unwilling? 
The similar securitizing “speech acts” and the extraordinary measures implemented, 
adopted in name in order to “defend” these countries from “economic migrants” and 
“aliens” with a different cultural background, all suggest that these four countries are 
likely to stay on a common platform in future EU asylum policy talks. 
The Visegrad Group has already harmonised its actions in the past. A Joint 
Statement of the Heads of Government of the Visegrad Group was adopted on 4 
September 2015 in Prague, where the Prime Ministers present promised full-fledged 
support for Hungary’s tackling of the migrant crisis and urged a constructive dialogue at 
the EU level. They agreed that the root causes of the crisis shall be resolved, and that 
significant EU financial assistance to Tukey and Jordan may be required to deal with the 
refugee issue. Meanwhile, they concluded that the effective implementation of the June 
EU Council conclusions on hotspots and further strengthening of the external borders is 
needed (VisegradGroup, 2015a). 
Another Joint Statement of the Head of States of the Visegrad Group was issued 
directly after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 3 December 2015. It is interesting to see that 
only the first two paragraphs deal there with the EU’s fight against terrorism (and the last 
paragraph is devoted to energy security), but more than seven paragraphs focused on 
migration and the refugee crisis, highlighting how important these issues are for the V4 
leaders. The Heads of States resolved to support the further enhancement of border 
control measures, the use of biometric data collection with the help of EU agencies, and 
the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement in order to reduce the migratory pressure 
from the South (VisegradGroup, 2015b). This concept of extraterritorial defense 
reappears in the Joint Article adopted by the V4 Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 
November 11 entitled “We offer you our helping hand on the EU path,” which may be 
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seen as a political message to Western Balkans states that the V4 group will support their 
EU accession talks but in return they should not forget about the expectations towards 
them in the context of the recent migration crisis (VisegradGroup, 2015c). The Joint 
Declaration of Ministers of Interior adopted on 19 January 2016 was the last document 
accepted before the extraordinary JHA Council Meeting planned for February of 2016. 
The Ministers of Interior called for the urgent implementation of hotspots, without further 
delay, highlighting that any debate about the potential revision of the Dublin Regulation 
can start only after the EU regained control over its borders. V4 countries strongly support 
increasing the detention capacity available in these hotspots. Their main goal is to prevent 
the “misuse of international protection” and to revise the European asylum legislation in 
order to eliminate further pull factors for “illegal migrants”. For the V4, the key priority 
is to achieve progress in the field of voluntary and forced returns of migrants and to start 
a pilot project of operational cooperation with Macedonia in border protection 
(VisegradGroup, 2016). 
While most of the Western European countries also express the urgent need for a 
new asylum policy and seek a reform of the Dublin Regulation to mitigate the problems 
related to the disproportionate sharing of asylum requests, the agenda-setting activity of 
V4 countries is markedly different. V4 Declarations use the language of security, 
reiterating the need of enhancing border control, speeding up procedures mostly in the 
field of forced return, and increasing detention capacities in order to prevent the 
movement of asylum-seekers.  
The governmental rhetoric securitising migration is proving quite successful in 
terms of domestic politics, across the region. Empirical evidence shows that most of the 
population in these countries rejects the idea of any kind of distribution scheme supported 
by the European Union. It is quite simple to understand why only 31% of the Slovakian 
population thinks that asylum-seekers should be better distributed: Slovakia is literally 
unaffected by the crisis and a beneficiary of the current Dublin legislation as a state 
without a Schengen border to the south. The Czech Republic, with ony 33% supporting 
relocation is quite similar. The two countries show the lowest support according to a 
TÁRKI survey 2015 (Bernát et al., 2015: 38). The same survey shows that 57% of Poles 
and 64% of Hungarians believe that asylum-seekers should be distributed more equally 
(Bernát et al., 2015: 39). A June 2015 opinion poll reported that 70% of Slovaks disagree 
with receiving refugees on the basis of the EU relocation quotas, and some 63% of the 
respondents saw refugees as a security threat (Pavelková, 2016: 2). Two thirds of the 
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respondents in the survey Ariadna says that Poland should not accept any refugees from 
the Middle East and North Africa. This poll shows a much worse attitude of Poles towards 
refugees than previous studies (Maliszewski, 2015). 
Hungarians’ comparatively higher level of support for relocation may not be 
entirely surprising considering the fact that Hungary registered the second highest number 
of asylum-seekers after Germany. Therefore, Hungarians would have numerous reasons 
to seek a re-distribution scheme should a situation arise where asylum seekers do not or 
cannot leave the territory of the country in the future.  
 
In search of a new EU solution to the crisis 
The recent refugee crises revealed severe flaws in the CEAS. The Dublin system, which 
functions on the basis of Council Regulation No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast) is at the center of numerous attacks from 
political figures as well as migration and refugee policy experts. 
As researchers of the Centre for European Policy Studies recently argued, there is 
a need for the whole of the EU, and not just a few member-states, to acknowledge that 
the Dublin System simply does not work and a new approach is urgently required (Guild 
et al., 2015). However, “after a five-year-long negotiation marathon among the Member 
States, the Commission, and the Parliament on the recast of the CEAS, the Member States 
are today less than ever inclined to accept common regulations” (Bender, 2015). Although 
the recast and revision process in 2013 raised the question of the need for more equitable 
burden-sharing, the CEAS still expects far more from the border countries that are 
responsible to register the first asylum requests, even as the standards of asylum 
procedure in these over-burdened border countries are significantly lower than elsewhere. 
Landmark judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) such as M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/11 revealed that the asylum reception 
conditions in Greece are well below expected, so the Dublin-based transfer of M.S.S. (the 
applicant) to Greece should not have taken place by Belgian authorities because they 
“ought to have known” that Greece is not a possible destination in terms of safe-first-
country conception. 
Therefore, the main question is to what extent the EU needs to reform the CEAS 
and the Dublin Regulation, and not if it needs to do so. Another important challenge of 
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the crisis is to decide whether a country must insist on the current legislation in place 
and/or support a new European agenda on migration. It is a Catch-22 situation, 
characterised by perverse incentives, where all a border state needs to do is to “prove its 
incompetence” and ask for help and/or common European support, because if they cannot 
prove their inability to act, tens of thousands of asylum seekers (or more) shall remain in 
their responsibility. A problematic implication of this is that proving the inability to fulfil 
the Dublin criteria can lead to severe EU sanctions. 
One way out from this vicious circle for EU states may be to disregard the former 
system and devise new solutions for the situation of a “mass influx.” Another possible 
solution would be to insist on the current system and register the applicants at all cost, 
knowing the fact that most of them are going to leave the countries concerned before the 
end of their asylum procedure. However, based on the Dublin III Regulation, these 
asylum-seekers must be transferred back to the first country of application. It could be an 
option for an over-burdened first country to suspend Dublin transfers temporarily – as 
Hungary did it in summer 2015 – but it would not be a real solution in the long term. 
In order to prevent such further unilateral actions and to strengthen solidarity 
within the European Union, many new proposals were adopted in Brussels since April 
2015. Two of them are especially important in understanding the position of V4 countries. 
The first is the JHA Council Meeting conclusion adopted on 20 July 2015 about voluntary 
pledges concerning refugee resettlement plans. The main goal of the meeting was to agree 
on a scheme in order to achieve a more equal distribution of refugee resettlement across 
the EU. The second one is the result of the JHA Meeting in September which agreed to 
temporarily relocate 120,000 persons from Greece, Italy and Hungary and create so-
called hot-spots, where EU agencies like FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) could work and help to improve the quality of the procedure, serving the 
best interest of the asylum-seekers. It is worth, however, to look at the V4 pledges, and 
compare them to the EU total: the numbers may speak for themselves. 
 
Member-state Share under resettlement 
distribution key 
Final pledge 
Czech Republic 525 400 
Hungary 307 0 
Poland 962 900 
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Slovakia 319 100 
V4 Total 2113 1400 
EU Total 20.000 22.504 
Table 1.6: Outcome of the 3405th Council Meeting – Justice and Home Affairs, 
Brussels, 20 July 2015. 
 
Member-state Final decision 
Czech Republic 1591 
Hungary 1294 
Poland 5082 
Slovakia 802 
V4 Total 8769 
EU Total 66.000 
Table 1.7: Council Decision 2015/1601, Brussels, 22 September 2015. OJ L 248 80-94. 
 
Most of the countries offered at least a limited pledge to resettle some of the refugees 
based on the JHA Council Conclusion of July 2015, but these numbers in the case of 
Visegrad Group countries were significantly lower than others’ pledges (see Table 1.6).  
Slovakia offered a pledge of 100 persons with a population of 5 million, the Czech 
Republic offered 400 with a population of 10 million, Poland offered 900 with a 
population of almost 40million population, while Hungary insisted that it will accept no 
resettled refugees. Although the resettlement of no more than a few dozen refugees would 
be a symbolic gesture of solidarity, Hungary explicitly rejected the idea with reference to 
having registered already more than 200,000 applications. It was a clear political signal 
to Brussels that Central European countries are not open to this kind of solution. A key 
argument of the group is that in their view a temporary relocation scheme of this kind 
may be the creeping introduction of a mandatory quota system in the long term. 
As far as the relocation scheme is concerned, we should not forget that the original 
plan aimed to relocate 120,000 persons, a group consisting of 66,000 persons from Italy 
and Greece, along with 54,000 from Hungary. Hungary rejected to be a beneficiary of 
this relocation scheme, and, in the end, with the Council decision of September 2015, 
became subject to a duty to relocate 1294 persons (see Table 1.7). The reasons behind the 
voluntary rejection of the original proposal, which offered a relocation of 54,000 from 
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Hungary, and the tacit acceptance of the relocation of 1294 to Hungary are not as difficult 
to comprehend as it may seem at the first sight. The 54,000 persons concerned have 
already left the country at the time when their relocation was offered, so literally no one 
remained to be relocated (Groenendijk - Nagy, 2015: 2). However, such a relocation plan 
would have created a hot-spot in Hungary, and this the Hungarian government did not 
accept. Hungary preferred the implementation of hotspots but only in Greece and Italy.  
While the original proposal from the Commission aimed at the relocation of 
applicants from three countries, namely Greece, Italy and Hungary on 9 September 2015 
(COM 450 Final) on the basis of Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU), the Council Decision 2015/1601 is about the relocation of 66,000 persons only 
from Greece and Italy. The other 54,000 persons will be relocated from “certain 
countries”, which have had severe difficulties with registering applicants.  
Whereas the resettlement scheme, adopted on 20 July 2015, functions strictly on 
a voluntary basis, the temporary relocation plan (Council Decision 2015/1601) was 
adopted on the basis of 78(3) of the TFEU, with qualified majority, in consultation with 
the European Parliament. Only four member states voted against the decision (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania). Although the plan reflects on an emergency 
situation for the benefit of some members-states (Italy and Greece), the countries that 
voted against the proposal claimed that it constitutes a “mandatory quota system,” and is 
thus unacceptable. 
They highlighted the one-sided argument of Article 78(3) TFEU, which talks 
about the actions “for the benefit” of member-states indeed, but forgets to mention the 
disadvantages of these actions caused for the other member-states. Two from these four 
countries are up to submit a lawsuit at the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) against the 
decision, claiming that the procedure was against the EU principle of subsidiarity and the 
Council ought to decide on this issue on the basis of 78(2) of the TFEU in co-decision 
with the European Parliament (Groenendijk - Nagy, 2015: 4). 
 
Conclusion 
The historical overview of the V4 countries’ asylum policies shows that the Visegrad 
Group had no previous experience with the mass influx of refugees. They established a 
system more or less harmonised with EU standards but a lot of work was still ahead before 
2014. Human rights concerns and ECtHR judgements found that the reception facility 
conditions remained below expectations even before the increase in asylum applications. 
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The European refugee crisis also showed that border control capabilities, which 
shall be based on the implementation of the Schengen Information System (SiS II) and 
EURODAC (European Dactiloscopy), and the use of modern equipment, such as thermal 
cameras and biometric scanners, were far below the acceptable level. Only the 
deployment of physical barriers such as barbed-wires fences (the temporary closure of 
the Schengen border) remained a viable option for certain countries, including Hungary 
(and subsequently Croatia and Slovenia). The temporary suspension of the Dublin III 
Regulation and the Schengen Agreement revealed that a fundamental reassessment is 
needed in order to find a long-term solution. 
Neither EU Commission proposals (COM 450) nor the few EU Council decisions 
adopted, such as Council Decision 2015/1601, were accepted unanimously and the 
Visegrad Group mounted strong opposition to Western European countries’ initiatives. 
Hungary as well as Slovakia filed lawsuits against the latter decision at the CJEU. 
Regardless of their chances of succeeding, the process will take time, and keeps the issue 
on the top of the European political agenda.  
In the meantime, over the course of 2015, irregular migration was framed 
increasingly as a security issue across the region. Not only the Orbán government and the 
Slovak PM Fico but also the newly elected PiS government in Poland and Czech President 
Zeman contributed to a securitisation of the issue. The metaphors used to describe 
refugees, as in the references to a “tsunami” and “parasites”, and descriptions of them as 
persons of concern related to terrorism and public health, played on the worst fears of 
populations in Eastern Europe. As of the beginning of 2016, the Paris terrorist attacks of 
November 2015 and the events in Cologne during New Year’s Eve seem to have ensured 
that this discourse cannot be plausibly expected to change in the near future. 
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